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ABSTRACT: This paper argues that the 2008 financial crisis accelerated a set of long-term dynamics which 
in turn have undermined two dominant models of state-society relations. On the one hand, the paper ex-
amines how the concept of social citizenship is based on a vision of state-society relations, which in recent 
years has been oriented by a philosophy of marketization of the state and of the relation between citizens 
and the state. On the other hand, it discusses an emerging emphasis on the role of organised civil society 
as a different and competing approach to state-society relations. Discussion will centre on how the inter-
actions between these two ideologies and the related practices have impacted on conceptions of the 
modern state. Among the factors that affect this interaction are the impact of migration, the erosion of 
welfare states, and the redefined character of social vulnerability which now affect new groups of individ-
uals. The paper considers all these changes as background phenomena which impact on relations between 
state and society in several ways, but particularly in terms of the meaning of social citizenship.  
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1. Introduction 
 
State-society relations – the distinctive area of inquiry of political sociology – can be 
approached from a variety of perspectives (Botelho 2014). State-society relations can 
be studied, for instance, at different territorial levels, in different policy sectors, focus-
ing on different societal bodies, and in comparative perspective (Sellers 2010). Yet only 
a few and relatively recent works conceptualise the two constructs – state and society 
– as mutually constructing each other and evolving over time (Migdal 2001; Sellers 
2010). The still dominant tradition of Weberian state analysis and its more recent insti-
tutionalist developments have often ensured that analysts prefer to focus on the ele-
ments of autonomy of the state from society (Evans, Rueschemeyer et al. 1985). This 
focus tends to downplay the evolving, dynamic and strategic perspectives that state 
actors espouse in response to changing societal trends. One of the most consequential 
events of recent years has been the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermaths. In order to 
assess states’ responses to the crisis, this paper will instead focus on the mutual consti-
tution of state and society as ongoing processes, and it will consider how the crisis con-
tributed to altering institutional arrangements, ideologies and policy practices, and 
how in so doing it has contributed to redefining key features of European states.  
The paper will then contrast two dominant conceptions of state-society relations. 
The first is a conception of a smaller, more accountable, more efficient and less waste-
ful state which is inspired by the principles of New Public Management (NPM). On this 
view, state-society relations are mediated by the pervasive role of business, both as an 
organizational domain and as a distinctive set of principles and practices. The second is 
a conception of participatory democracy which centres on the inclusion of civil society 
actors in a variety of roles and policy domains. Although these conceptions seem irrec-
oncilable, it will be argued that they have several elements in common. Furthermore, it 
will be posited that the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermaths have stimulated pro-
cesses of interaction and hybridization which the paper will analyse. The main geo-
graphical area of reference will be the European Union, which although very diverse, is 
undergoing similar processes, and which in this paper can be treated as a unit undergo-
ing similar changes.  
First discussed will be the ideologies and practices of New Public Management 
(NPM) as a defining element of state-society relations in recent decades in which the 
business sector has come to support state legitimacy. This has taken place as a conse-
quence of perceived shortcomings of previous state models. It will then be argued that 
a set of fundamental shortcomings attributed to the NPM paradigm have stimulated a 
search for alternatives, and particularly the inclusion of a wider range of non-state ac-
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tors in the process of state legitimation. This wide range of actors notably include those 
generally categorised as civil society.  
The paper will then examine state-society relations as a topic central to an ongoing 
normative discussion taking place in academic settings and in current political debate, 
and which results in different models of inclusion of non-state actors. This normative 
discussion implies contrasting views of the appropriate role of the state in relation to 
society. It will be argued that these contrasting views constitute emerging ideologies 
and types of state-society relations: that is, it will be argued that contrasting visions of 
the state are core elements in contrasting political visions. The paper will first briefly 
review the tradition of NPM reforms, which appeared earlier in Europe. It will then dis-
cuss the distinctive features of the ethos of the inclusion of civil society organizations 
(CSOs) in policy-shaping and policy-making. It will then consider the impact of the fi-
nancial crisis and the evolution of these two ideologies in recent years.  
 
 
2. The context of a changing European state 
 
Early analyses of the state typically emphasized features generally described as the 
Weberian state. These centred around the bureaucratic and hierarchical aspects, and 
also their professed and normatively pursued insulation from societal forces as a pro-
tection against particularism (Poggi 1990). The authority and autonomy of the state as 
conceptualized by Weber was mainly a normative concept that attributed maximum 
efficiency to self-contained and integrated political-bureaucratic organizations (Sellers 
2010). This paradigm became increasingly untenable over time. Several historical de-
velopments contributed to eroding the image of the Weberian state. Briefly, one was 
the contraction of the European welfare state. Welfare states developed and expanded 
in relation to a variety of political actors and beneficiaries which the relevant literature 
has categorised into well-known models (Esping-Andersen 1990). For instance, differ-
ent beneficiaries of the welfare state in different countries came to develop structured 
power relations with the state which eroded the autonomy of welfare states (Greve 
2010). The second process which eroded state sovereignty was the acceleration of the 
process of globalization, which redefined key functions of states, taking away many as-
pects of their autonomy but also granting other roles, such as important steering roles 
in economic matters vis-à-vis the international arena (Weiss 1998). These and other 
dynamics contributed to promoting conceptualizations of the state not as an essential 
and fixed entity but as a set of relations within a changing political environment and as 
a set of changing societal discourses (Jessop 2007). Whilst preserving the notion of the 
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state’s relative autonomy, recent state theories have broadened the set of determi-
nants of state action, albeit in several and often contrasting ways. This paper focuses 
only on two areas of relations between the state and society: organised business and 
organised civil society (OCS). It argues that they correspond to distinctive modes of 
state-society relations which recent events have made particularly salient and forced 
them to interact across what still remain fundamental ideological divides.  
By ‘state-society relation’ is meant the modal type or types of relations established 
between state institutions and social organisations to negotiate their mutual interac-
tions, the exercise of public authority, and the institutionalised set of values that state 
and societal groups jointly agree to promote. This includes negotiating the allocation of 
public resources and accepted criteria of representation and accountability. This defini-
tion is in line with similar definitions of national and international organisation1. State-
society relations can then be conceptualised as a complex set of social exchanges be-
tween the state and another (or other) organisational domain(s). It is an exchange that 
often implies exchanges of legitimacy, resources and delegation of power to achieve 
mutually valued goals. Clearly, more than one type of exchange can take place at the 
same time in plural societies, such as, in the case examined in this paper, states’ struc-
tured exchanges with business groups and with civil society organisations (CSOs). Simi-
larly, it is possible that conflicts take place in a set of social and political arenas on dif-
ferent visions and practices of state-society relations. With reference to Europe, exam-
ined in turn will be the NPM and CSO modal programmes and ideologies. 
  
 
3. NPM, Citizenship and the state 
 
NPM reflects a fundamental paradigm change that took place in the 1970s and 
1980s and accorded a prominent role as legitimacy providers and public policy inspirers 
to market actors. Politically, this change reflected the ideas of Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan who on each side of the Atlantic launched sweeping accusations against 
what they regarded as the overpowering influence of the state in the daily lives of citi-
zens. Their programme of concerted retrenchment of the state was particularly incisive 
in the public sector. It was however part of a broader programme of transition from 
Keynesianism to monetarism in economics which had far-reaching political implica-
tions. It was also a different way to conceptualise state-society relations. It gave new 
 
1
 See for instance DFID (2010). Building Peaceful States and Societies, London, Department for Interna-
tional Development. 
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dignity to economic actors such as bankers and the financial industry, and it under-
mined the power of some state actors. In the words of Peter Hall, who in his seminal 
analysis of the UK in the 1970s and 1980s postulated the notion of an elite-driven par-
adigm change in which institutions, interests and ideas interact to foster change: 
“Keynesians tended to regard the private economy as unstable and in need of govern-
ment intervention; monetarists saw the private economy as basically stable and gov-
ernment intervention as likely to do more harm than good” (Hall 1992, 92).  
This anti-state bias was a response to an economic crisis which the British state and 
also other European states were seen as unable to address. For different reasons it was 
enthusiastically embraced by a composite group of economic and political actors be-
yond the economic elites valued by the NPM ideology, and it set the stage for a global 
change in a wide range of public policies. Their emerging vision of state-society rela-
tions countered the previously dominant vision espoused by the labour movement in 
which legitimacy did not derive from business visions and practices, and in which the 
state was accorded an interventionist role. Similarly marginalised were the ideas put 
forward by spokespeople from universities, trade unions, and those of various kinds of 
welfare state representatives. In some respects, the social legitimacy of one elite re-
placed that of another. The type of relational model that emerged as a guideline for 
the conduct of state affairs was different from the one that had become institutional-
ised in previous years, and which was based on an elite of intermediaries operating at 
meso-level in corporatist arrangements in state-society relations (Jessop, Bonnett et al. 
1989). Economic actors were glorified and incorporated as individuals and firms not as 
intermediary bodies; social actors were conceptualised as consumers and users of state 
services, not as citizens. 
The ideology of business efficiency and of a retrenched state promoted interven-
tions in the area that politics could best control: the public sector. This in turn resulted 
from what is now known as the programme and the ideology of new public manage-
ment (NPM). Over the last forty years this has become an imperative which has per-
meated the entire European public sector and has been popularised by the guidelines 
of international organisations and supranational aggregations such as the EU, which 
have widely institutionalised NPM and more generally the role of market actors in pub-
lic policy systems (Lane 2000, Pollitt, Thiel et al. 2007). Clearly, there have been signifi-
cant differences in the timing and the types of implementation of NPM reforms. None-
theless, they have often been adopted as new state mythologies and embraced by a 
variety of political and bureaucratic actors in garbage-can processes, and they have 
served an array of varied and even contrasting interests (Cohen D. et al. 1972; Meyer 
and Rowan 1991). 
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The distinctive features of the NPM programme have changed over time and have 
adapted to different contexts, to the point that comparative analysts of NPM reforms 
see them as “bogged down in a quagmire of critical revisions and assessments” 
(Gualmini 2008 ). However, besides the strong anti-state bias, there are recurrent ele-
ments which most analysts acknowledge (Van de Walle and Hammerschmid 2011). 
These notably include the assumption that the market discipline that characterises bu-
siness organisations should also inspire the public sector, and often more generally so-
ciety as a whole. This means that the relation between political actors and social actors 
should be a contractual relation that can be evaluated by well-defined criteria, inter-
rupted in the case of non-performance, and enhanced by reforms that instil competi-
tion among market actors – reforms which include a reconceptualization of citizens as 
consumers able to choose in a marketplace of competing services. This also entails the 
fragmentation of services, the defined duration of contracts, and the fight against all 
situations of monopolistic closure of public sector provisions (See for instance: Lane 
2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). As Van de Walle and Hammerschmid argue, this im-
plies a low-politics level of managerial reforms and a broader vision of the role of gov-
ernment in society (Van de Walle and Hammerschmid 2011, 191).  
With reference to the first level, Hood (1991) stresses the role of hands-on and en-
trepreneurial management; explicit standards and measures of performance; output 
controls; desegregation and decentralisation; competition in the provision of public 
services; stress on private-sector styles of management; and discipline and parsimony 
in resource allocation (Hood 1991; Van de Walle and Hammerschmid 2011). As an 
overall vision of relations between government and society, NPM articulates the New 
Right’s ideas of the small state, deregulation, privatisation and marketisation (Van de 
Walle and Hammerschmid 2011, 192). However, the NPM philosophy was quickly 
adopted by a set of political forces broader than the New Right. It was to some extent 
redefined and toned down but substantially adopted by New Labour in the UK, and to 
varying extents by a growing set of other European political parties.  
If NPM arrived in Northern Europe after decades of the universal and ‘traditional’ 
welfare state, in Mediterranean and Eastern Europe the managerial approach was de-
veloped against a background of more recent and fragile welfare state structures (Lane 
2000). Both in education and health the ethos of ‘free choice’ led to a growth of the 
private sector in Nordic countries. In southern countries such as Italy, NPM ideas have 
been developed later, and particularly since the 1990s due to increasingly generalised 
negative views of the public sector and the supposed inefficiencies of public employ-
ees. In Italy and elsewhere regime transformations such as the transition from the first 
republic to the second accomplished the task of institutionalising the NPM philosophy 
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through the electoral success and societal impact of a new set of political parties and 
movements, such as the Northern League and Forza Italia (Ruzza and Fella 2009). It 
should be noted that the ideological content of the NPM programme was such that in 
several cases the adoption of a NPM political discourse often corresponded to rather 
poor implementation of its principles, remaining nonetheless central to political mani-
festos and therefore consequential in terms of discrediting NPM opponents and legiti-
mating supporters. In some countries, the adoption of the NPM model has been more 
selective and gradual, but nonetheless significant, at least at the discursive level.  
In some cases NPM reforms met little opposition and were just taken for granted. In 
Poland and other East European countries, post-communist regimes adopted from the 
outset a neo-liberal reform programme that took NPM principles for granted, making 
them almost imperceptible to public debate. The UK is an example of an early adopter: 
it is the country that has most enthusiastically embraced the principles of NPM and has 
most prominently shifted away from strong universalistic programme coverage. A po-
litical culture favourable to NPM had deeply permeated the public sector, offering a 
paradigmatic test case for determining the overall impacts of NPM, for identifying its 
shortcomings, but also for evaluating its alternatives.  
Nonetheless the diffusion and institutionalisation of the NPM philosophy has often 
met with strong principled opposition, as was clearly manifest in several south Europe-
an countries. Criticisms concerned threats to public welfare as well as doubts about the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the reforms. 
 
 
4. Criticisms of NPM and alternatives 
 
The ideological nature of NPM principles and the fact that they have been enthusias-
tically spread by international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank has of-
ten been acknowledged by the literature, which also acknowledges that precisely be-
cause of their diffusion and by now taken-for-granted character, they do not amount to 
a coherent and cohesive programme, but rather to a set of ideals that are likely to be 
interpreted and reinterpreted in different locations and modified over time (Kapucu 
2006). Nonetheless, despite their prevalence, several observers criticize them on a 
number of grounds. While NPM principles have become a set of prescriptions, they 
have often been unable to deliver the cost-effectiveness and the efficiency that they 
promised (Christensen and Laegreid 2007). There have been problems with output 
steering and control, and staffing levels have not generally decreased as sought by 
NPM reforms (The Secretary-General of the OECD 2010). They have radically increased 
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institutional and policy complexity, making administration almost unmanageable and 
occasionally leading to “policy disasters” (Dunleavy, Margetts et al. 2006, 468). They 
have not been able to respond to new social demands, especially in the face of the 
processes of diversification enhanced in all European societies by globalization and by 
the proactive role of the EU (Van de Walle and Hammerschmid 2011). Thus their ability 
to address old and especially new vulnerabilities has often been questioned. Users are 
often bewildered by a vast array of competing services, by the extreme fragmentation 
of the market for services that NPM reform engender, and by the fact that users are 
often unable to choose among poorly and even falsely communicated alternatives. 
These problems are compounded for vulnerable users who may not have the cognitive 
skills to navigate a very complex marketplace (Misztal 2011). They may not have the 
citizenship entitlements necessary to support their access to services. Subgroups in the 
population, such as migrants and the increasing precariat, may not have the social, ter-
ritorial and economic stability necessary even to be willing to use some of the services, 
such as health or educational services (Standing 2011 Falge, Ruzza et al. 2012).  
Several reforms of NPM programmes have been attempted with varying results, and 
we can now speak of a second and a third generation of NPM programmes (Christen-
sen and Laegreid 2007; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Forty years of NPM have led to a 
set of ever-changing implementation methods, but the ideology has retained many of 
its distinctive features. With all its limitations, as an ideology NPM is so entrenched 
that it is not going to lose relevance even when subjected to severe criticisms. This is 
also because the neo-liberal ideology that justifies and anchors its prescriptions re-
mains salient in political programmes, even amidst the worst crisis of recent genera-
tions and despite the widespread opinion that it contributed to creating it (Crouch 
2011). Rather, it is adjusting to the new challenges that recent technological, social and 
economic developments are raising. Thus the literature on NPM has now attempted to 
come to terms with the impact of the Europeanisation of governance structures in var-
ious policy sectors, the impact of internet technologies in the monitoring and imple-
mentation of public policies, and the need to enlarge the range of non-state actors in-
volved in policy shaping and delivery (Dunleavy, Margetts et al. 2006; Christensen and 
Laegreid 2007). 
Analysts and practitioners have started to investigate how to transcend market-
centred models of policy delivery while retaining the NPM focus on cost-effectiveness 
and accountability (Christensen and Laegreid 2007). In doing so a number of alternative 
avenues have been suggested and at least partially institutionalised. One such ap-
proach includes supporting the role of the state and of the market through contribu-
tions from other non-state actors, notably organised and un-organised civil society 
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(that is, for instance, single individuals or small informal groups active in the public 
sphere) in their advocacy and service-delivery roles (Dunleavy, Margetts et al. 2006: 
468). This effectively amounts to a merger of the NPM program with the alternative 
approach described below, which is based on the inclusion of public interest groups 
and other civil society actors.  
In a way, it was precisely the institutionalisation of the role of business actors in var-
ious policy sectors and in political discourse which made possible and legitimised an in-
fluential role of other non-state actors in a variety of policy-related capacities, such as 
NGOs, advocacy groups, think-thanks, institutionalised social movement groups, chur-
ch-related groups, anti-discrimination groups of various kinds. This expansion of the 
role of non-state actors in state-society relations occurred, not as a complete reversal 
of the ethos of NPM, but rather as an integration and a modification of existing princi-
ples. It also produced an integration of the two models – those of the NPM and the 
CSOs. For instance, a model of public-private mix in healthcare system reforms has 
emerged as dominant in several polities, while at the same time evidence of its limita-
tions and failures has grown. It is a model in which non-state organisations often span 
the divide between the for-profit and the non-profit sector. As we will see, they merge 
the two models under the heading of the ‘social economy’ (Amin 2009). However, it is 
useful first to discuss the emergence of the civil society ethos as an application of ide-
als of deliberative and participatory democracy in policy arenas.  
 
 
5. Civil society and active citizenship as models for state-society relations 
 
In recent years, citizens’ involvement has become an even more recurrent issue on 
political and policy agendas. The interest in social and civic participation can be ex-
plained by multifarious reasons. There is for instance a need to introduce monitoring 
organisations to control policy implementation as a response to rather generalised epi-
sodes of political corruption, which have highlighting deficiencies in democratic pro-
cesses and produced widespread anti-political sentiments. There is a need to address 
issues of political representation and enduring public sector inefficiency. A further con-
tributory factor is the difficulty of developing persuasive mechanisms of political repre-
sentation in complex governance structures like the EU.  
Calls for the involvement of civil society groups in public policy and more generally in 
the public sphere have emerged at the broader international level, and they have been 
strongly supported by international organisations and by civil society groups active in 
international and developmental arenas (Colas 2002; Bartelson 2006, Joachim and 
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Locher 2008; Liebert and Trenz 2010). A belief in improving citizens’ involvement has 
permeated European states at all territorial levels. This is an important cultural and 
structural change that has marked most European states.2  
Calls for a stronger impact of civil society on democratic rule have a long history da-
ting back to Tocquevillian approaches and the Scottish Enlightenment. An emphasis on 
civil society has resurfaced in recent decades. In the 1990s the ethos of civil society in-
volvement gained new impetus in response to the collapse of the Soviet bloc (Cohen 
and Arato 1999). Soon references to civil society emerged as a new ideology, a ‘grand 
narrative’ that opposed civil society as the voice of the people against vested interests, 
state corruption and self-referential political systems (Misztal 2001).  
In Europe the imagery of civil society also emerged as an attempt to find new re-
sponses to an interconnected set of crises which NPM programmes had been manifest-
ly unable to resolve. The growing process of Europeanisation over the post-war years 
had meant a transfer of sovereignty to the European level that undermined the legiti-
macy of decision-making by European member states and, to a growing extent, pro-
duced a rejection of the process of European construction as a whole, which was per-
ceived to be in crisis, particularly after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. Indeed 
the evolving structure of European governance remained obscure and unwelcome to 
large part of the European population. It was perceived as being based on unfair mech-
anisms of political representation (Kröger and Friedrich 2012). In this context, OCS pro-
vided alternative channels of representation (Ruzza 2010). A large body of official liter-
ature issued by EU institutions promoted the role of CSOs as channels for better infor-
mation on the policy needs of Europeans. Typical in this respect was the White Paper 
on Governance and the documents that supported its preparation (ESC 2001; European 
Commission 2001; European Commission, Preston et al. 2001).  
Civil society came to constitute a new mythology not only as a response to anti-
political and anti-statist sentiments but also in response to a process of Europeanisa-
tion that was often perceived as pursuing a neo-liberal strategy which imposed the 
costs of globalisation on the weaker components of the labour market. CSOs have a 
strong role in anti-discrimination policies at EU level. They focus on protecting funda-
mental rights and the rights of discriminated groups in the population, and their role is 
 
2
 Important differences in openness to non-state actors persist, as the literature on the impact of social 
movements in policymaking has often shown – see: Rootes, C. A. (1999). "Political Opportunity Structures: 
promise, problems and prospects." La Lettre de la maison Française d’Oxford 10: 75-97. However, this lit-
erature emphasises that state openness is a variable that characterises in different ways different policy 
sectors and different levels of government, whereas in recent years one observes a general and growing 
ethos of increased state openness to civil society. 
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enhanced by the fact that they act at the top of a system of public interest representa-
tion within which they can convey information from member states to EU institutions 
(Ruzza 2014). Civil society then became one of the central political mythologies that 
have characterised the EU in an attempt to provide it with popular legitimacy (Della 
Sala 2010).  
 
 
6. Civil Society and the Crisis 
 
However, despite the strong legitimacy of CSOs at EU level and their varying but 
growing importance in member states, the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermaths 
have undermined their power in several ways. At a general level, sweeping budget cuts 
in several member states have reduced funding for civil society initiatives throughout 
the years of the crisis. This has had a particularly strong impact on smaller NGOs, which 
are less able to withstand financial hardship because a small reduction in the budget of 
a small CSO may mean that the organisation is no longer viable. Secondly, the shift to 
the right that has marked the EU in the years of the crisis has fostered a vision of civil 
society which is typically different from the leftist vision of a civil society empowered 
by the state – a civil society which relies more fully on volunteering, and which is active 
in service delivery roles rather than in advocacy roles. Also the political right tends to 
favour local-level civil society initiatives, which deprive CSOs of national policy-shaping 
impact.  
Apart from these general considerations relative to the crisis, the role of civil society 
has been undermined by fundamental problems in selection of the CSOs to be funded, 
and by self-selection of volunteers and activists who often tend to come from those 
sectors of the population less in need of additional associational representation. These 
problems have been widely addressed by the literature on associational representa-
tion, but they are still largely unsolved (Cohen, Rogers et al. 1995; Hirst and Bader 
2001; Warren 2001).  
In addition, as has often been argued, a strong and effective civil society sector 
needs a strong and effective state if it is to work to its best ability, but this is not often 
the case in times of crisis, and in times of still triumphant NPM ideologies (Knight, Chi-
gudu et al. 2002). The effectiveness of the state is crucial in ensuring the effectiveness 
of the role of civil society as it supports CSOs’ implementation role, their role in moni-
toring effective legislative compliance, their information-gathering role, their occasion-
al redistributive role, the formation of CSO personnel, etc. The crisis and the cumula-
tive impact of globalization on the autonomy of European states indicate that these are 
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often no longer able to play these roles. As a consequence, the effectiveness and range 
of action of CSOs is widely differentiated in Europe. It is maximum in Nordic countries 
where strong trust and social capital in the population, a tradition of overall state 
openness, high levels of education and rich and articulated organisational ecologies of 
CSOs have supported the multifarious functions of civil society (Wallace and Pichler 
2007). For instance, in Denmark, over 10 % of GDP derives from non-profit production 
and 38 % of the population is involved in voluntary work. However, this is not the case 
in other contexts. In poor areas CSOs have additional problems in accessing, acquiring, 
and effectively utilising public funding and creating effective working relations with 
other CSOs, as shown by comparative studies on the role of NGOs in the field of health 
and migration (Falge, Ruzza et al. 2012). 
There are countries, such as Italy and Poland, which have moved in the direction of a 
general openness of state structures to a wide range of non-state actors, and which at-
tempt to include public interest associations of various kinds in consultations, but low 
state effectiveness and poor civil society professionalization hamper these attempts. 
The UK is a Member State which has broadly experimented with the inclusion of civil 
society groups in local policy processes in a variety of policy sectors – an emphasis that 
has often accompanied both a declared intent to weaken state-based provisions, as 
well as a desire among different political actors to address growing concerns about so-
cial exclusion (Fanning and Dillon 2011). However, different UK governments have un-
derstood the roles and functions of civil society in very different ways – from New La-
bour’s state-centred tradition of ‘compacts’ to the very different Conservative ‘Big So-
ciety’ – and this has generated much uncertainty on how to regulate the sector (Hilton 
and McKay 2011).  
If CSOs are to achieve the objectives that they set themselves, they need access to 
policymaking circles, and often an amount of resources, legal knowledge and some 
stability over time. These features are differently distributed among different types of 
organisation in the sector. In effect, civil society should be conceptualised as an ecolo-
gy of organisations that differ in terms of levels of institutionalisation, propensity for 
social and political conflict, service delivery, social research, representation of specific 
constituencies and ability to network (Warren 2001). While organisations inspired by 
social movements may be best at confronting vested interests and impacting on the 
public sphere, more conventional CSOs are often more effective in gaining and retain-
ing access. It is therefore useful to consider the internal differentiation of the ecology 
of associations that constitutes civil society. In particular, the CSO sector has under-
gone further differentiation in recent years. On the one hand, there are large, institu-
tionalised, politically accepted NGOs, which in several European contexts are further 
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expanding their broad competences in several domains, such as health policy. On the 
other hand, there are small monothematic NGOs, which have often been severely pe-
nalised by the crisis and the diminished state resources that this has entailed in several 
European Member States.  
 
 
7. The crisis and state-society relations  
 
The two paradigms of state-society relations – NPM and OCS -- described in the pre-
vious sections have operated next to each other for decades. They have been different-
ly incorporated and reinterpreted by different political forces. As mentioned, in some 
areas and for some actors they have merged at least to some extent. However, since 
2008 their importance and interaction has changed. The impact of the crisis has been 
important in orienting this interaction.  
The European landscape during the crisis has been marked by an overall sizeable de-
cline in social protection (Natali 2013). On the basis of recommendations by interna-
tional organizations such as the IMF, the OECD, the G20 and also the European Com-
mission, as the financial crisis progressed European countries increasingly interpreted it 
as a crisis of public debt, substantially reducing public-sector state expenditure. The a-
verage Eurozone deficit level fell from a deficit equivalent to 6.4% of GDP in 2009 to 
3.1% in 2013. (ETUI 2014, 22). The risk of poverty increased, particularly in the Euro-
zone3. 
The measures adopted included sharp increases in indirect taxes such as VAT, and 
cuts to public spending, which included cutbacks in state benefits and unemployment 
support, often by reducing the time of entitlement (ETUI 2014, 22). Over the years of 
the crisis, employment levels fell very markedly in some countries and overall by 1.7 
percent in the period 2008-2010 alone, and then they stagnated. However, these fig-
ures mask a transformation in types of employment contracts, because one outcome 
of the crisis was a decline in men’s permanent employment and an increase in part-
time employment (ETUI 2014, 28). Unemployment disproportionally affected the popu-
lation with lower education levels. At member state level, patterns of employment 
were also rather differentiated, with the proportion of temporary employment increas-
ing or remaining constant in twenty-one countries and declining in seven member 
 
3
 This is defined as “the share of the EU population either with income below 60 percent of the median 
average household income or facing severe material deprivation or living in a low work intensity house-
hold” ETUI (2014). Benchmarking Working in Europe. Brussles, European Trade Union Institute. 
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states, but this included countries such as Greece and Spain where the overall rate of 
employment of all types sharply declined (ETUI 2014, 28). One must add to these alar-
ming trends long term issues such as the very high levels of youth unemployment in 
southern countries. Similarly worrying is the likelihood of young women in southern 
Europe and several eastern European countries becoming trapped in inactivity and un-
employment (ETUI 2014, 43).  
It is apparent from data such as these that the current crisis has contributed to an 
increase in the number of vulnerable people – people with low levels of unemployment 
and often without the skills necessary to improve their prospects. This crisis has also 
had a major impact in terms of general standards of living, particularly for southern Eu-
ropean countries. It has had a substantial impact on the public sector, whose size has 
declined across Europe (Glassner 2010). While marked differences remain in the over-
all relative size of the sector in terms of employment, some of the largest member 
states have witnessed the sharpest decline: for instance Italy, where the size of the 
sector declined sharply during the crisis and in the period 2004-2008 leading up to the 
crisis (Glassner 2010, 11). Austerity measures became the priority of international bod-
ies, and this had a decisive impact on highly indebted countries of Southern Europe, 
which focussed on reducing the size of the public sector as one of the measures less 
difficult to achieve (Glassner 2010, 5).  
In the context of shrinking public sectors, declining state resources, and particularly 
declining support for vulnerable groups of the population, which as mentioned include 
the young, the unemployed, migrants and increasingly a transversal sector of the popu-
lation – the precariat – NPM recipes appeared increasingly unavoidable to analysts. Re-
verting to or creating strong welfare states appeared untenable even to a generally dis-
satisfied electorate. Growing anti-political sentiments, increased perceptions of ethnic 
rivalry for jobs and for the remaining resources of shrinking welfare states instead re-
sulted in a shift to the right that was clearly visible in the 2014 European elections. This 
turn also undermines the possibility of utilising CSOs to address some of the negative 
impacts of the crisis.  
Whilst an expanded role of civil society and its organisations has been debated for 
several years, the occurrence of an extended financial crisis has had a complex impact 
on the societal search for alternatives to a system of service delivery for vulnerable 
groups which in recent decades has been guided by NPM principles, but which broad 
sectors of the European population and an increasing number of scholars consider inef-
ficient, at least in its original formulation (Christensen and Laegreid 2007). In this con-
text, the financial crisis may well induce a paradigm shift of the kind that other crisis 
have induced and which the literature has well documented (Hall 1993). However, it is 
Carlo Ruzza, The ideology of New Public Management 
  
504 
 
not going to be a simple replacement of NMP values with the ethos and practices of 
voluntarism. A redefined role of civil society could be at the core of such a paradigm 
shift.  
 
 
8. Discussion 
 
The paper has identified NPM and civil society as two opposing visions. – two ideo-
logies still not fully crystallized and frequently reinterpreted and complemented by his-
torically and socially variable elements which emerge at different points in time and in 
different contexts. This context can usefully be described through the metaphor used 
by Freeden in his studies on ideology (Freeden 1996; Talshir, Freeden et al. 2006). He 
conceptualises ideologies as varying in degrees of formalisation. Those which are still 
not fully formed have a strong centre which consists of key tenets which, in our case, 
set value on competition, accountability, cost-effectiveness, on the one hand, and on 
deliberation, participation and volunteering on the other. However, Freeden argues 
that non-fully formed ideologies are surrounded by clusters of other concepts that vary 
like the dialects of a language and become suited to different environments, and con-
nected to broader over-arching ideologies. Thus, the OCS and the NPM ideologies 
change in different contexts and evolve in response to major challenges, such as the 
current crisis.  
The crisis is making the contribution of CSOs indispensable. Their volunteers provide 
service delivery support that states can hardly afford. But this selects out certain OCS 
organisations and marginalises others, such as advocacy-oriented groups, which find 
themselves disadvantaged, as EU-level research indicates (Ruzza 2014). On the other 
hand, the hardship caused by the crisis also encourages political protest. Thus in the 
years of the crisis a number of social movement-inspired organisations have emerged, 
sometimes providing services to disadvantaged groups. CSOs operating in a financially 
difficult environment are themselves obliged to embrace NPM values, and some do so 
by becoming prominent actors in public-private service delivery systems together with 
for-profit organisations. The crisis is thus inducing an integration of the two main mod-
els of state-society relations of recent decades. 
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